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Abstract To discuss moral behavior in organizations, a
growing number of authors turn to a ‘virtue ethics’
approach. Central to this approach is the so-called moral
character of individuals in organizations: a well-developed
moral character enables organizational members to deal
with the specific moral issues they encounter during their
work. If a virtue ethics perspective is seen as relevant, one
may ask how organizations can facilitate that their mem-
bers can exercise and develop their moral character. In this
paper, we argue that the way tasks are defined and inter-
linked (the organization’s structure) has a profound influ-
ence on ‘‘exercising and developing moral character’’—it
can enhance and frustrate it. In order to show how struc-
tures may support organizational members to exercise and
develop their moral virtues, the paper first describes what it
means to exercise and develop virtues in an organizational
setting and what is required for it. Next, the paper sets out
to explain how specific values on different structural
parameters (formalization, decentralization, specialization,
and unit grouping) at different structural levels (micro,
macro, and network) relate to exercising virtues in
organizations.
Keywords Virtue ethics  Moral character 
Organizational structure
Introduction
For some years now, there has been a growing interest in
virtue ethics in organization literature. That is, many
scholars have turned to virtue ethics to understand and
guide ethical conduct in organizations (see, for instance,
the special issues of Organization Studies (2006), Business
Ethics Quarterly (2012), Journal of Business Ethics (2013),
and Business Ethics: a European Review (2015), which
were all devoted to virtue ethics).
What sets virtue ethics apart from other ethical approa-
ches is that it frames ethics in terms of the question ‘‘How
should I live my life?’’ instead of ‘‘What should I do’’? (cf.
Weaver 2006, p. 349). Virtue ethics is about living one’s life
in the best possible way, that is: about striving to develop
one’s characteristically human capacities into virtues (cf.
Achterbergh and Vriens 2010). Part of living one’s life in the
best possible way is cultivating one’s ‘‘moral character.’’ A
well-developed (virtuous) moral character disposes one to
desire, choose, and do the right thing: just acts stem from a
just character (cf. Aristotle 1984, 1105b1-10). As Weaver
(2006, p. 341) summarizes, the emphasis of virtue ethics is on
‘‘[…] virtue or character: what a person is or has rather than
merely what a person does.’’
Translating this to ethical conduct in organizations,
virtue ethics inspired business ethicists stress the exercise
and development of our moral character1 (as part of living
a fulfilled life) in an organizational context and rely less on
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mere compliance to rules (see also Hartman 2008). But, if
exercising and developing our moral character becomes an
issue, it also becomes relevant to understand the organi-
zational conditions fostering it (cf. Weaver 2006, p. 357;
Moore and Beadle 2006).
In this paper, we want to highlight one particular orga-
nizational condition: the way jobs are defined, related, and
coordinated. With Mintzberg (1983) we refer to this con-
dition as the organizational structure. We believe that
organizational structures make a difference with respect to
the prospect of exercising and developing virtues in orga-
nizations (a belief we share with others—e.g., MacIntyre
1985, Jos 1988; Luban et al. 1992; Moore 2005a, b; Moore
and Beadle 2006; Breen 2012; Beadle and Knight 2012;
Weaver 2006). In fact, as some authors argue, some
structures frustrate the exercise and development of our
moral character (typically bureaucracies, cf. MacIntyre
1985; or Tayloristic, ‘‘technicist’’ structures, cf. Breen
2007, 2012) while other structures may enable us to
exercise and develop our moral character (as, for instance,
discussed in Achterbergh and Vriens 2010; Moore and
Beadle 2006; Beadle and Knight 2012; Schwartz and
Sharpe 2010; Schwartz 2011; Breen 2012).
In this paper, we focus on these enabling, supportive
structural conditions [an endeavor, also called for by
Hartman (2008), Beadle and Knight (2012) and Weaver
(2006)] in a systematic way. More specifically, we follow
scholars on organizational structures (e.g., Mintzberg
1983; de Sitter 1994) to specify supportive structural
conditions for exercising and developing virtues at two
‘‘structural’’ organizational levels (at the micro-level of
individual jobs, and at the macro-level of the organiza-
tion) and at the level of organizational networks. To this
purpose, we use four structural parameters: unit-grouping,
decentralization, job-specialization, and formalization. In
doing so, we set out to contribute to the current discussion
about ‘‘virtuous structures’’ by providing a detailed (or-
ganizational theoretic) description of the structural char-
acteristics enabling virtuous behavior in (networks of)
organizations.
The main strategy to realize our goal is that we identify
(1) requirements for exercising and developing moral
character in organizations, and (2) structural characteristics
(at two organizational levels and at the network level)
contributing to these requirements. Thus, we characterize
supportive, ‘‘virtuous’’ structures. But, it should be clear
from the outset that structures, however much they are
geared at the requirements for exercising and developing
virtues, they do not by themselves guarantee or determine
virtuous behavior. Our thesis is that structural conditions
increase the possibility of exercising and developing moral
character (a thesis shared by others—as we will discuss
below) by their contribution to its requirements.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we discuss the importance of a systematic treatment of
structural conditions for exercising and developing virtues.
In ‘‘What is Required for Exercising and Developing Vir-
tues in Organizations?’’ section, we discuss what it means
to exercise and develop virtues in organizations and iden-
tify three requirements for the prospect of doing so. In
‘‘Virtuous Structures at the Enterprise Level’’ and ‘‘Virtu-
ous Structures at the Job Level’’ sections, we will discuss
supportive structural conditions at two organizational
levels: at the ‘‘enterprise’’ level (‘‘Virtuous Structures at
the Enterprise Level’’ section), and at the level of indi-
vidual jobs (‘‘Virtuous Structures at the Job Level’’ sec-
tion). In ‘‘Virtuous Structures and Networks’’ section, we
treat ‘‘virtuous networks’’ by going into the structural
characteristics of networks of organizations. Finally, the
last section summarizes and reflects on our findings.
The Importance of a Systematic Treatment
of Organizational Structures for Virtuous Action
in Organizations
In this paper, we want to offer a systematic treatment of how
organizational structures can support exercising and
developing moral character in organizations. As virtue
ethics has it, developing our moral character is part of living
a fulfilled life as a human being; it is part of our self-real-
ization. And so, as we spend much of our lives in an
organizational setting, one could say that making sure that
organizational structures help us to develop our moral
character is an important endeavor. Moreover, as members
of organizations, we encounter all kinds of situations having
a moral purport, calling for the exercise of our practical
wisdom and moral virtues so that we desire, choose and do
the right thing for the right reasons. Organizational struc-
tures should support—and not hinder—us in this exercise.
On these views, it may even be seen as a moral obligation to
build structures that support the exercise and development
of moral character as such structures help organizational
members to live a fulfilled life and at the same time enable
them to engage in morally sound action (although, of
course, supportive structures do not guarantee just behav-
ior). So, in the first place, the search for structures nurturing
moral character is relevant in the context of improving our
human condition. (cf. Breen 2007, 2012; Schwartz and
Sharpe 2010; for similar arguments directly tied to struc-
tures and virtue ethics; or Schwartz 1982; Walsh 1994;
Michaelson 2011; Michaelson et al. 2014, for similar
arguments in the context of meaningful work).
At the same time, the current treatment of structures for
supporting virtues still seems to be underdeveloped. That
is, in our view, the attention paid to the role of structures is
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somewhat biased; in that it often focuses on the frustrating
effect of structures instead of their enhancing effect.
Moreover, studies focusing on the supportive effect of
structures might, in our view, still be improved upon.
Authors, such as MacIntyre (1985), Jos (1988), Luban
et al. (1992), and Schwartz and Sharpe (2010), mainly
describe the frustrating effect of structures. For instance,
MacIntyre (1985) ferociously attacks bureaucracies as
structures in which it is very difficult to exercise and
develop virtues. As Jos (1988) and MacIntyre (1985) argue,
we cannot expect much from members of bureaucracies,
morally speaking, because they should ‘‘parcel out their
soul,’’ ‘‘eliminate all personal motivations,’’ and ‘‘develop
a habit of painstaking obedience’’ in order to efficiently
carry out ‘‘the tasks that are entrusted to them by those
above them in the hierarchy’’ (Jos 1988: 329–330).
Bureaucrats aren’t supposed to exercise their moral char-
acter in the context of their work; they should see them-
selves ‘‘[…] as morally neutral characters whose skills
enable them to devise the most efficient means of achieving
whatever end is proposed’’ (MacIntyre 1985, p. 74).
Besides those expressing a negative influence of struc-
tures on virtuous behavior, there are several authors who
acknowledge the need to understand the positive role of
structures in supporting the exercise of virtues in organi-
zations. For example, Weaver (2006) acknowledges the
potentially positive influence of structures (particularly
related to ‘‘job-design and social network structure,’’
p. 359) and calls for more research. Likewise, Moore
(2005a, b), Beadle and Knight (2012), and Breen (2007,
2012) explore the conditioning role of structures for exer-
cising virtues (given their MacIntyrian notion of virtue
ethics). Moore (2005a, p. 251), for example, suggests that
virtue-supportive jobs require ‘‘team-building and
empowerment’’ as well as ‘‘more information and power to
make decisions’’ so that ‘‘employees are able to exercise
self-control and self-direction.’’ In (2005b), Moore adds an
appropriate ‘‘power-balanced structure’’ as another struc-
tural requirement to make his MacIntyrian virtue-ethics
approach work. Beadle and Knight (2012) formulate a
MacIntyre-based, virtue-ethics idea of ‘meaningful jobs’
and argue that particular job features and characteristics as
formulated in the area of individual job design may foster
the exercise of virtues. Designing ‘virtuous’ jobs entails
‘‘creating complete units of work,’’ ‘‘increasing the range
and difficulty of tasks’’ and ‘‘improving feedback’’ (p.
439). Beadle and Knight also call for more research into
job redesign in the context of virtue ethics, so that we can
come to understand how to ‘‘[…] develop the types of
workplaces in which virtues are cultivated and people
flourish’’ (p. 446). Likewise, Breen (2007, 2012) introduces
the idea of ‘‘phronetic production’’ in which the work
organization comprises ‘‘complex and coherent’’ tasks
(Breen 2012, p. 621), allowing employees to have ‘‘an
overview of the entire work’’ (p. 612) and in which ‘‘[…]
there is no categorical distinction between those who lead
and those who follow’’ (p. 621). In addition, Bernacchio
and Couch (2015) argue that structures should enable
participatory governance so as to enable organizational
members to align the goals of the organization to overar-
ching goods of the community. And, starting from a more
Aristotelian notion of virtues, Schwartz (2011) argues that
organizational structures should be less formalized so as to
nurture ‘‘practical wisdom.’’
These suggestions for structural conditions enabling
virtuous behavior in organizations fit Moore and Beadle’s
(2006) general description of requirements for virtuous
business organizations. Virtuous organizations require, in
their view, preconditions at three levels. They require (1)
virtuous agents, (2) a conducive mode of institutionaliza-
tion, and (3) a conducive environment. The supportive
structural conditions as discussed by the above authors can
be regarded as attempts to describe parts of the conducive
mode of institutionalization enabling the virtuous behavior
of organizational agents.
So, prior research does treat enabling structural condi-
tions for exercising and developing virtues. However, we
feel that this treatment can be extended in several ways so
as to increase our understanding of supportive structures. In
particular, we think that the organization design framework
featuring four (related) structural parameters at three dif-
ferent levels, presented in this paper, can help gain a more
in-depth understanding of the effect of structures on vir-
tuousness. We argue that by means of this framework we
can further our understanding of supportive structures in
the following ways. First, by making explicit that at least
four structural parameters are relevant for developing and
exercising virtues, we propose to add the parameter ‘‘unit
grouping’’—how activities are grouped into organizational
units—to the parameters already (implicitly) discussed in
literature. Second, we employ ideas from organization
design theory to provide a more detailed framework for
understanding and designing structures enhancing virtuous
behavior. The framework makes more explicit that and
how structural parameters are involved in designing tasks
enhancing virtuous behavior. Third, the framework can
help understand the interrelations between and the joint
effect of structural parameters on virtuous behavior. It can
help us to see, for instance, that structures at the macro-
level of organizational structures condition the design of
individual jobs in which virtues can be exercised and
developed. Or, it can help us to see that the positive effect
of parameters on virtuousness can be enhanced or frus-
trated by the effect of another parameter. Fourth, the
framework adds to our understanding of supportive struc-
tures by including three different levels: the macro-level,
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the micro-level of individual work, and the level of net-
works of organizations. This is an addition because the
network-level has received virtually no attention in the
literature. In all, we set out to extend our understanding of
the supportive influence of organizational structures on
exercising and developing virtues by a more detailed
treatment of all relevant structural parameters (and their
relations), at a macro- and micro-level of organizations,
and at the level of a network of organizations.
Our search for virtuous structures in this way also fits
the model of preconditions for virtuous organizations given
by Moore and Beadle (2006). By means of our framework
of structural parameters at three different levels, we hope to
extend our knowledge of (1) conducive institutionaliza-
tions—by means of understanding supportive structures at
the two organizational levels, and (2) conducive environ-
ments—by treating supportive structures of inter-organi-
zational networks.
What is Required for Exercising and Developing
Virtues in Organizations?
In order to discuss organizational structures supporting
exercising and developing virtues, we need to explain what
it means to do so in organizations. Moreover, we need to
describe what this requires in organizations. These
requirements will serve as an anchor for discussing the
supportive ‘‘virtuous’’ structures we are after.
Exercising and Developing Virtues
In this paper, we assume that the reader is familiar with an
Aristotelian account of exercising and developing virtues.
That, is, we assume the following basic virtue ethics
notions from the Ethica Nicomachea. A key notion from
Aristotelian virtue ethics is eudaimonia, living a fulfilled
life as a human being. Living a fulfilled life is aimed at
perfecting our most characteristically human capacities
(the capacity for reason and—in a derivative sense—for
desire) into virtues. This makes virtue ethics a teleological
approach, as it sees perfecting our capacities into virtues as
the goal of a human life. Two virtues are particularly rel-
evant in discussing ethical conduct: moral virtues (which
dispose us to desire the right thing—‘the mean’—in
specific situations with respect to emotional and desidera-
tive dimensions, and which disposes us to desire the right
thing for its own sake) and practical wisdom (which is
about knowing what it means to life a fulfilled life in
general, and which enables us to construct, choose and act
in an ‘‘appropriate’’ (morally good) way in particular cir-
cumstances (realizing our desire to life a fulfilled life here-
and-now). With Sherman (1989), we will say that practical
wisdom and moral virtues constitute our ‘‘moral character’’
and come together in making choices about how to live a
fulfilled life in particular circumstances, guiding our
everyday moral life by providing us with a desire to do the
right thing and the capacity to act in accordance with this
desire.
We exercise the virtues of our moral character to deal
with everyday moral issues in particular situations. This
means that (a) we see that a particular situation is morally
relevant, (b) we see the relevant related moral dimensions,
(c) we see the appropriate mean on these moral dimen-
sions, (d) we desire to act in a way that hits this mean and
desire this for its own sake, (e) we are able to select an act
(by means of deliberate or intuitive construction and
judgment) that fits the desire, given the particulars of the
situation, and finally (f) we act accordingly because it is the
right thing to do. Moreover, based on our actions we may
receive immediate feedback (e.g., in terms of the emotions
displayed or reactions given by those who experience the
results of our actions) and use that to adjust our ideas about
what is morally relevant and desirable, and about the
appropriateness of our action, and, if the situation allows it,
adjust our actions—see Fig. 1 for an overview.
Exercising virtues also entails that we can reflect (both
individually and with others) on how we framed and dealt
with a moral issue in a particular situation, on how others
reacted to that, and that we use this reflection to further
refine our moral character (see also Fig. 1). In this way,
exercising virtues is embedded in an experiential (moral)
learning cycle by means of which we further develop
(shape and perfect) our moral virtues and practical wisdom.
So, based on our moral character, we deal with moral
issues, and by exercising our moral character we further
develop it (see also right hand side of Fig. 1).
Exercising and Developing Our Moral Character
as Members of Organizations
As virtue ethics is about perfecting our moral character so
that it disposes us to desire, choose, and do the right thing
for the right reasons, we might ask what it is that makes our
actions, performed as organizational members ‘right’
actions—actions we may desire for their own sake, in the
context of living a fulfilled life.
To answer this question, we may start off from Solo-
mon’s treatment of virtues in organizations who sees
individuals as members ‘‘[…] of (at least) two communities
at once—the organizational community and the larger
surrounding (global) community’’ (Solomon 2004: 1023),
and hence our virtuousness refers to being a member of
both communities. As he writes: ‘‘What is worth defending
in business is the sense of virtue that stresses cooperative
joint effort and concern for consumers and colleagues
674 D. Vriens et al.
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alike’’ (2004: 1025). Exercising and developing virtues in
organizations, then, relates to ‘doing the right thing’ (1)
with respect to other members of the organizational com-
munity, and (2) with respect to the organization’s envi-
ronment—the society an organization contributes to.
As a ‘‘virtuous’’ member of an organizational commu-
nity, we exercise and develop our moral character with
respect to others in the organization. This can be done
in situations that are not directly tied to our job-related
activities (e.g., comforting a grieving colleague). Helping
others in distress is something that virtuous actors would
normally desire and do for its own sake. If these others are
(accidentally) other organizational members, virtuous
members of organizations would of course desire to help
them as well. However, such not directly job-related
behavior falls beyond the scope of this paper.
Exercising and developing our moral character with
respect to others in the organization can also be done as
part of our job. For instance, if a virtuous actor sees that
certain job-related actions may cause others down the line
to do extra work, the actor may acknowledge this as an
unwanted effect and may try to prevent it. Or, if a manager,
responsible for designing working conditions sees that
certain choices he made have led to degrading work, he—
as a virtuous manager (see also Moore 2008; Beabout
2012, for the possibility of virtuous management)—may
see that this is an unwanted effect and may try to redesign
these conditions.
So, as a virtuous member of an organizational commu-
nity I desire to do the right thing for other members of that
community. I should desire this for its own sake, and given
my practical wisdom (and skill), I should devise and
implement actions realizing this desire.
As Solomon argued, organizational members are also
members of a larger community (society) and exercising
and developing our moral character as organizational
members should also relate to this larger community. An
organization may contribute to this larger community by
means of its (intended or unintended) output (e.g., by
means of its products, services, diminishing waste, wages,
employment, etc.). As some authors put it: organizations
may contribute to ‘‘the good of a community’’ they are part
of (cf. Achterbergh and Vriens 2010; Breen 2012; Moore
2012; Bernacchio and Couch 2015; Sison and Fontrodona
2012). Achterbergh and Vriens (2010) and Sison and
Fontrodona (2012), for instance, explicitly discuss this
contribution in terms of the organization contribution to the
flourishing of organizational members. Now, as an orga-
nizational member I contribute to the organization’s output
(and hence possibly to the communal good) by means of
my job-related activities. Virtuously exercising and
developing my moral character in this context means that I
am genuinely concerned with the well-being of the societal
members the organization’s output relates to (either
directly—e.g., consumers, clients, patients, or indirectly—
e.g., those affected by pollution, or unemployment). That
Moral Character 
- Moral virtues 
- Practical wisdom 
Dealing with moral issues in particular situations:  
a. Seeing the moral relevance of a situation 
b. Seeing the moral dimensions of a situation 
c. Seeing the ‘mean’ on the moral dimensions related 
to the situation  
d. Desiring the ‘mean’ on the moral dimensions related 
to the situation for its own sake 
e. Constructing, deliberating and judging about 
possible actions realizing our desire to do the right 
thing and selecting an action 
f. Acting accordingly 
Experience and reflection on experience 
Development: 
Further shape 
and perfect…
Use 
feedback 
to adjust... 
Fig. 1 Exercising and
developing our virtues
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is, I care for this well-being for its own sake and desire that
the output of the organization contributes to it. Moreover, it
entails devising and implementing job-related actions
contributing to this desired output. In order to be virtuous,
then, organizational members should have an idea of the
output of the organization and assess whether it does
contribute to the well-being of societal members. More-
over, they should have an idea of their own contribution to
the desired output and devise and implement job-related
actions so as to deliver their contribution to it. (This may
also entail changing the output itself, if it is assessed to be
undesired).
Our description of exercising and developing virtues as
part of organizational member’s jobs—i.e., with respect to
other members of the organization and to the organiza-
tion’s environment (see also Solomon 1992; 2004), relies
heavily on Aristotelean ethics and politics (which both are
about Eudaimonia). A similar concern with others in the
organization and the wider community can also be found in
neo-Aristotelean (MacIntyrean) thought, in which exer-
cising virtues relates to both the so-called practice which an
institution (e.g., the organization) houses and the wider
community (cf. MacIntyre 1999; Moore 2005a; Moore and
Beadle 2006; Beadle and Knight 2012).
An important implication of this line of thought is that
all that we do in organizations can be considered from a
‘‘technical’’ and from a ‘‘moral’’ point of view. From a
technical point of view, we can assess whether an action is
effective to realize a particular goal. From a moral per-
spective, we can assess whether an action contributes to the
well-being of organizational or societal members and can
be desired for its own sake.
It is also important to note that contributing to the well-
being of societal members in this reasoning is not maxi-
mizing a utilitarian ‘‘greatest amount of good for the
greatest number.’’ Rather, it should be understood as con-
tributing to conditions enabling societal members to live a
fulfilled life, because this is the right thing to do (cf. Sison
and Fontrodona 2012). The notion of ‘‘contributing to the
well-being of societal members’’ also relates to the capa-
bilities approach (cf. Nussbaum and Sen 1993; Nussbaum
2011; Bertland 2009) which states that societies should
secure the necessary ‘‘capabilities’’ for human develop-
ment. And, as part of society, organizations can contribute
to creating these capabilities (cf. Bertland 2009, for a dis-
cussion on the relation between virtue ethics and the
capabilities approach). With van Tongeren (2004, p. 12), it
can be argued that based on virtue ethics one can think of
‘‘just’’ institutions (or a ‘‘just’’ society) as those institutions
(or that society) that stimulate people to exercise and
develop virtues. Similar ideas are put forward by:
Achterbergh and Vriens 2010; Koehn 1998; Collins 1987;
Solomon 1992, 2003, 2004; Newton 1992; Mintz 1996.
Requirements for Virtuous Structures
In this section, we discuss three structural requirements that
should be met so as to enable organizational members to
exercise and develop their moral character:
1. structures should provide a ‘‘teleological context’’—
i.e., they should enable organizational members to see
and reflect on the goals and output of the organization
in relation to its societal contribution. Moreover, they
should be able to see how tasks (at different organi-
zational levels) are connected to this contribution;
2. structures should provide a ‘‘deliberative context’’
enabling organizational members to (learn to) act
virtuously in specific circumstances—in such a way
that they can actually realize their fulfilled life as an
organizational member in the best possible way. This
entails that structures should help organizational
members to see the consequences of their actions, to
provide them with requisite operational variety and
regulatory potential, and to grant them the opportunity
to learn;
3. structures should provide the ‘‘social context’’ required
for reflective discussions about the societal contribu-
tion of the organization and for deliberating about
actual job-related actions needed to realize this
contribution.
Requirement 1: Teleological Context
A first requirement for enhancing exercising and develop-
ing virtues as organizational members is that structures
should provide members with a ‘teleological context’—in
which they can see and reflect on how the organization’s
actual goals and output are related to its societal contri-
bution. In addition, to be able to serve as an anchor for their
own moral organizational behavior, structures should
enable members to see how their own tasks are connected
to organizational goals and output. This entails that struc-
tures at each organizational level should enable members to
be ‘in touch’ with the goals and the output of the organi-
zation. Based on such knowledge, we can assess the pos-
sible consequences of our own organizational task to
society. That is, based on this knowledge we can, for
instance, judge whether we contribute to just or doubtful
goals, whether our tasks contribute to unintended harmful
side-effects, or whether our tasks may endanger the pro-
duction of (in itself valuable) output. ‘Keeping in touch’
with organizational goals and output is relevant for exer-
cising and developing virtues, for, if organizational goals
aren’t clear to organizational members, they don’t know
what they are contributing to—and they necessarily remain
clueless about whether their contribution makes a
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difference to society. In fact, they may be contributing to
particularly evil ends—a point vividly made by MacIntyre
(1985) and Bauman (1989). The idea of keeping in touch
with goals is also raised by other authors on virtues in
organizations. For instance, by Moore (2005b: 675) who
argues that ‘‘[…] the practice-institution combination must
reflect on its own telos’’ to make sure that its purpose is a
‘‘just purpose.’’ Bernacchio and Couch (2015) also raise
this issue in their discussion of ‘‘governance modes’’
securing the alignment of organizational goals to the good
of the community. Being in touch with goals is also a
requirement for making sure that the ‘bureaucratic self’
does not take control over our moral life, as MacIntyre
(1985) (and before him Weber) has it, because if we know
the goals we are contributing to, we can question them.
A similar reasoning applies to keeping in touch with the
organizational output. If members have no knowledge of
the overall performance of the organization, they are
unable to relate their own tasks to it, let alone that they can
judge whether their tasks contribute to something valuable
for society.
So, to support virtuous behavior in organizations,
structures should provide what we call a ‘‘teleological
context’’—which enables organizational members to see
how the actual goals and output of the organizations are
related to the organizational contribution to society and to
see how their tasks relate to this contribution.
Requirement 2: Deliberative Context
Structures should enable organizational members to exer-
cise and develop their moral character in specific circum-
stances so as to enable them to come up with actions that
actually realize living a fulfilled life as an organizational
member in the best possible way. So, where the teleolog-
ical context provides an awareness of the societal contri-
bution, goals and output of the organization and how tasks
are connected to them, this second requirement should
enable the actual context-specific deliberation and action
needed for virtuous behavior. To this end, it is required that
structures enable organizational members to (A) see the
(possible and actual) moral consequences of their (potential
and actual) actions, and (B) provide them with the oppor-
tunity to devise and implement virtuous actions so as to be
able to bring about the desired moral consequences..
Seeing the Consequences of Actions Exercising and
developing virtues in organizations implies that we can see
the moral consequences of our job-related activities, i.e.,
whether they do indeed have the intended, desired effect
(and not other, unintended, undesired effects). Without an
awareness of the consequences of our job-related activities,
we cannot assess their possible harm or benefit (see also
Luban et al. 1992; Grant 2007). The less we know about
the consequences of our actions, the harder it is to exercise
our practical wisdom and think about appropriate alterna-
tives. Exercising our virtues entails that we should be
aware of the possible consequences of our actions for other
organizational members and know how our job-related
activities contribute to the (intended and unintended) out-
put of the organization. Seeing the actual consequences of
our moral actions is required for monitoring their appro-
priateness in a specific situation and for adjusting them (if
necessary). It is also a prerequisite for further developing
our moral character, for this occurs by reflecting on these
moral consequences. If we do something with the intention
to do the right thing, and we cannot see the consequences
of this action in terms of how it influences the (fulfilled)
life of those affected, it becomes difficult to know whether
our intention did indeed lead to the desired moral effect in
this particular situation. And, as a result, it becomes
impossible to reflect on these actions (and on the desire
serving as a background for it) and adjust either desire or
moral action to guide us in similar future situations. Moral
learning, then, requires knowledge of the consequences of
our actions (see also Weaver 2006, for a similar argument
with respect to moral identity).
In organizations, this means that, ideally, one has an
overview over the production process one is part of; one
knows how this process is broken down into parts and how
they are connected—so as to be able to trace possible and
actual consequences of one’s actions and know their
impact to all parts of this network—and beyond (this is
related to Grant’s idea (2007) of ‘relational jobs’ in which
workers know the impact of their job on beneficiaries and
have contact with them, to Beadle and Knight’s (2012) plea
for ‘‘complete units of work,’’ or to Breen’s (2012)
‘‘phronetic work’’—see earlier).
In all, exercising and developing our virtues in organi-
zations is supported by structures that allow us to see the
possible and actual internal and external moral conse-
quences of our organizational actions.
Devising and Implementing Virtuous Actions Besides
knowing the moral consequences of one’s (actual and
potential) actions, one should also be enabled to influence
these consequences. Put differently, one should be enabled
to grasp the moral essentials of a particular job-related
context, to formulate possible moral actions, to deliberate
and judge with respect to them, to select and carry out
fitting actions, monitor their results and adjust the actions if
required. Moreover, exercising and developing virtues
entails that organizational members should reflect on their
actions and further refine their moral character. This
requires, in our view, that jobs should be sufficiently rich,
i.e., they should include both enough ‘operational variety,’
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‘cohesion,’ and ‘regulatory potential.’ Based on opera-
tional variety and regulatory potential organizational
members can influence the moral consequences of their
job-related activities.
Our jobs need a certain degree of operational variety and
cohesion, otherwise exercising moral character would lack
efficacy. That is, if my job only consists of a few very small
short-cycled activities, I may simply not have the time for
moral decision making, and action and learning. And, even
if I had the time, and I realized that certain moral actions
might be required, it may very well be that based on the
few short-cycled activities that I am supposed to carry out,
I would not be able to engage in moral action as part of my
job. In a similar vein, I may see that my job contributes to a
wrong end—but given the low variety of my short-cycled
activities I may not be able to do anything about it. What
kind of sustainable contribution can I make if I only sort
out flawed material on a fast moving conveyer-belt? How
can I change my contribution in the desired direction if I
lack the operational variety for doing so? In this respect,
Breen (2012) states that jobs should contain a ‘‘complex set
of interrelated tasks […] that […can…] be combined in a
effective way’’ (p. 621). Such jobs are coherent, in that
they are meaningfully and logically tied to the output.
A similar line of reasoning applies to moral develop-
ment. If my job doesn’t allow me to perform activities
beyond a narrowly defined set of activities, I may never
learn about the appropriateness of other possibilities to deal
with certain moral issues. Experiential learning seems to
imply a certain operational variety so as to be able to
experiment and learn about other ways of dealing with
problems (see also Kolb 1984; Weaver 2006).
Besides operational variety, we also need the regulatory
potential to propose certain actions that are morally
required and the discretionary power to implement them
(see also Beadle and Knight 2012; Moore 2005a; Breen
2012 who argue for job-related decision power to enhance
virtuous action). For instance, we may find out that a
particular supplier uses human resources in a way that is
suspicious—e.g., by exploiting workers in developing
countries). If we want to do something about it, we should
have the discretionary power to either put pressure on this
supplier to change things, or to find other suppliers and
make new arrangements with them—or at least to put the
matter on the agenda. If one doesn’t allow for the dele-
gation of regulatory potential to the relevant levels, one
cannot really make moral guidance an issue, for it may lead
to the situation in which one may see that changes are
needed but that their realization depends on higher level
managerial action.
Other authors have also hinted at the necessity of these
operational variety and regulatory potential for virtuous
behavior (e.g., Moore 2005a, b; Weaver 2006; Breen 2012;
Beadle and Knight 2012). Beadle and Knight, for instance
(p. 439) argue that ‘‘increasing the range and difficulty of
tasks and creating complete units of work’’ (operational
variety) fits their MacIntyrean understanding of exercising
virtues. They also argue for more regulatory potential ‘‘as
workers […] are brought into decision-making and nego-
tiation about the purpose and organization […]’’ so that
they can ‘‘pursue their own standards of excellence’’ (p.
439).
Requirement 3: Social Context
The last requirement for ‘virtuous structures’ that we want
to stress is that they should provide members of organi-
zations with the opportunity to be an active part of a social
network. This relates to Solomon’s ideas of the role of
‘organizations as communities’ in the context of virtue
ethics (e.g., Solomon 2004). As virtue ethics suggests, we
apply and develop our moral character as social beings.
The (organizational and larger societal) community we are
member of, serves as a background for our moral aware-
ness, and our moral deliberation, judgment and reflection
as we deal with moral issues. And, at the same time, the
communities we are part of provide the network of relevant
others required for social deliberation and reflection. This
social network also provides a ‘communal’ background in
which moral virtues and practical wisdom may develop.
Communication with other members of the organization
may fine-tune our job-related moral virtues and it may help
us to improve our practical wisdom. It is by means of
interaction and communication that we experience (most
of) the results of our moral actions, and communication
helps us to reflect socially on our moral values, actions and
their consequences. Being connected with others, then, is a
requirement for moral action and development of our moral
character in organizations (cf. Koehn 1998; Solomon 2004;
Weaver 2006). The social embeddedness is also apparent in
Moore’s (2005b) and Moore and Beadle’s (2006) sugges-
tion that one should engage in a ‘‘critical dialogue’’ or in
Beabout’s (2012) argument that virtuousness requires
‘‘reasoning with others about the worthiness of ends’’ (p.
426). MacIntyre (1999) concludes that a social setting is
crucial for moral agency as ‘‘[…] accountability to others,
participation in critical practical enquiry and acknowl-
edgement of the individuality both of others and of one-
self’’ (p. 317) depend on it.
Ideally, this social context includes internal and external
stakeholders. This point is also explicitly made by Moore
(2012), who writes that a ‘‘[…] contribution to the over-
riding good of the community […requires…] a continuing
debate within the organization, and ideally between the
organization and the community or communities of which
it is a part’’ (p. 309). In all, structures should provide jobs
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that are sufficiently socially connected to each other and to
the relevant environment (cf. Achterbergh and Vriens
2010).
Virtuous Structures, Parameters and Levels
In this paper, we define virtuous structures as organiza-
tional structures that can realize the teleological, deliber-
ative, and social context requirement and in this way
enable organizational members to exercise and develop
their moral character. An organizational structure is defined
as the way in which the organization’s overall task is
decomposed into subtasks and how these subtasks are
coordinated (cf. Mintzberg 1983).
To describe and design organizational structures, so-
called ‘structural parameters’ have been developed.
Although different authors distinguish different parameters
(e.g., Pugh et al. 1968; Mintzberg 1983; Galbraith 1977; de
Sitter 1994; de Sitter and den Hertog 1997), most of them
agree on four basic parameters: unit grouping, decentral-
ization, job specialization, and formalization. Each of these
parameters can have different ‘values.’ Dependent on the
values of its parameters, the structural lay-out of an orga-
nization has particular characteristics, enabling or disabling
organizational members to act in particular ways. For
instance, if the value of the structural parameter ‘decen-
tralization’ is ‘low,’ organizational members in the oper-
ating core of the organization have little decision authority
regarding the regulation of their own work (Pierce and
Delbecq 1977). This does not help them to learn to solve
job-related problems by themselves. Structural parameters
can be used to describe virtuous structures. In this case, the
question is, ‘‘Which value should the structural parameters
have in order to provide organizational members with the
teleological, deliberative, and social context to be able to
exercise and develop their moral character?’’
Organizational structures can be described and designed
at different levels of an organization. In this paper, we
distinguish two levels.
The first is what Nadler and Tushman (1997) call the
‘enterprise level.’ At this level, one finds the units (busi-
ness units, production flows, departments, teams, groups)
that make up the organization. Note that the enterprise
level may have a complex structure, for instance, it may
consists of business units that comprise departments that, in
turn, comprise teams. At the enterprise level, the parame-
ters ‘unit grouping’ and ‘decentralization’ are of particular
importance. In ‘‘Virtuous Structures at the Enterprise
Level’’ section, we use these parameters to describe vir-
tuous structures at the enterprise level.
The second level is that of individual workers and their
jobs. We call this level the ‘job level.’ The relevant
parameters at this level are ‘job specialization’ and
‘formalization.’ In ‘‘Virtuous Structures at the Job Level’’
section, we use these parameters to discuss virtuous
structures at the job level.
Virtuous Structures at the Enterprise Level
In this section, ‘virtuous structures’ at the enterprise level
are at issue. To this purpose, we ask ourselves what the
values of the relevant parameters at the enterprise level—
unit grouping and decentralization—should be in order to
increase the probability of the realization of the teleologi-
cal, deliberative, and social context requirement. Structures
with these parameter values are the virtuous structures at
the enterprise level we are looking for. To discuss these
virtuous structures, we start in ‘‘Enterprise Level: Unit
Grouping’’ section with the parameter unit grouping.
‘‘Enterprise Level: Decentralization’’ section deals with the
parameter decentralization.
Enterprise Level: Unit Grouping
To discuss virtuous unit grouping at the enterprise level of
organizations, we first define this parameter and describe
its extreme values (‘‘The Parameter Unit Grouping’’ sec-
tion). Then, in ‘‘Virtuous Unit Grouping’’ section, we
describe virtuous unit grouping in theory. ‘‘Virtuous Unit
Grouping: A Practical Example’’ section discusses a
practical application of virtuous unit grouping in a home
care organization.
The Parameter Unit Grouping
The parameter ‘unit grouping’ refers to the way production
activities are grouped into organizational units, e.g., busi-
ness units, departments, teams (cf. de Sitter 1994; de Sitter
and den Hertog 1997; Mintzberg 1983). The parameter unit
grouping can have two extreme values: ‘high’ and ‘low’
functional concentration (cf. de Sitter 1994; de Sitter and
den Hertog 1997).
In the extreme case of high functional concentration, all
order types are potentially coupled to all operational sub-
systems or units (cf. de Sitter and den Hertog 1997, p. 507).
An example of high functional concentration would be an
organization producing two types of doors and three types
of windows (five order types in total). Moreover, in this
organization all sawing activities are grouped into a
‘sawing department,’ all sanding activities into a ‘sanding
department,’ all assembly activities into a ‘assembly
department,’ and all finishing activities into a ‘finishing
department.’ In this organization, each department pro-
cesses all order types, i.e., all order types are potentially
coupled to each of the units (see Fig. 2).
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In the extreme case of low functional concentration,
each order type is produced by its own corresponding unit
(cf. de Sitter and den Hertog 1997, p. 507). In this case,
each unit should have its ‘own’ personnel and equipment in
order to produce ‘its’ order type. In this way, relatively
independent parallel production flows come into existence.
In the literature, low functional concentration is also called
‘flow production’ (de Sitter and den Hertog 1997; Womack
et al. 1990; Seddon 2008).
In the example, low functional concentration would
mean that five units are formed, each with its own sawing,
sanding, assembly, and finishing activities, personnel, and
equipment. In this case, not all order types are coupled to
all units (see Fig. 3).
Of course, high and low functional concentration as
portrayed in the example are extreme values of the
parameter unit grouping. An example of an intermediate
degree of functional concentration would be two flows: one
dedicated to the production of doors, the other to the pro-
duction of windows.
Note that the idea of high and low functional concen-
tration is also reflected in Mintzberg’s distinction between
‘function’ and ‘market’ based unit grouping (Mintzberg
1983, pp. 53–54). Moreover, unit grouping has also been
discussed along these lines by Walker and Lorsh 1968;
Anand and Daft 2007.
Virtuous Unit Grouping
The grouping of activities into units at the enterprise level
directly affects the creation of a teleological and social
context (requirements 1 and 3). Moreover, it provides con-
ditions for the design of individual jobs enabling the exercise
and development of moral character (requirement 2).
From the two extreme values of unit grouping—high
and low functional concentration—low functional con-
centration (flow production) seems to provide the best
conditions for the realization of the three requirements.
Low functional concentration at the enterprise level of an
organization means that organizational units at this level
produce a subset of all the order types produced by that
organization. For production purposes, each unit is a pro-
duction flow that has its ‘own’ goals, input, throughput,
output, personnel, and equipment. This production flow
provides a basis for organizational members to be in touch
with ‘their’ flow’s impact on and contribution to society. It
provides a basis for the teleological context needed to
develop and apply work-related virtues. Moreover, this type
of grouping allows for ‘flow-related’ communication,
enabling discussion about the unit’s ‘telos’ in relation to that
of the organization. Finally, flow-related production allows
organizational members to assess the appropriateness of
their activities in relation of the organization’s ‘telos.’
If functional concentration is high, all units are poten-
tially connected to all order types. Particularly if the
number of different order types is high, organizational
members working for these units tend to lose sight of both
the unit’s and the organization’s contribution to society (de
Sitter 1994; de Sitter and den Hertog 1997). Workers
concentrate on the function of their unit (e.g., ‘sawing’ or
‘finishing’), not on the organization’s contribution to
society (e.g., producing a particular type of windows or
doors). As a result, communication in these units, will tend
to be ‘function-related,’ not ‘flow’- and ‘telos-related’
(Seddon 2008; Donaldson 2001; Mintzberg 1983). It
appears that high functional concentration stands in the
way of realizing the three requirements.
Ordertype 1 
Ordertype 2 
Ordertype 3 
Ordertype 4 
Ordertype 5 
Sawing 
Depart-
ment 
Sanding 
Depart-
ment 
Assembly 
Depart-
ment
Finishing 
Depart-
ment
Fig. 2 Example functional concentration
Ordertype 1 
Ordertype 2 
Ordertype 3 
Ordertype 4 
Ordertype 5 
Sawing, Sanding, Assembly, Finishing 
Sawing, Sanding, Assembly, Finishing 
Sawing, Sanding, Assembly, Finishing 
Sawing, Sanding, Assembly, Finishing 
Sawing, Sanding, Assembly, Finishing 
Fig. 3 Example flow production
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Virtuous Unit Grouping: A Practical Example
The Dutch homecare organization ‘Buurtzorg’ (Dutch for
‘neighborhood care’), may be used to illustrate the effects
of high and low functional concentration at the enterprise
level on realizing the three requirements for virtuous
behavior. Because of its success, (see Nandram (2015b,
pp. 345–346) for Buurtzorg’s successful performance in
terms of quality of care and quality of work), Buurtzorg has
been the object of recent (international) attention (cf.
Monsen and de Blok 2013; Verloop and Hillen 2014;
Nandram 2015a, b; and the Royal College of Nursing
2015).
Jos de Blok, the founder of Buurtzorg, a home-care
nurse himself, was dissatisfied (in fact: morally indignant)
with the functionally concentrated, hierarchical, and
bureaucratic home-care organizations that were prevalent
in the Netherlands since the 1980s. As an alternative, he set
up an organization in which, ‘‘nurses form self-directed
teams that provide home care services with minimal
administrative oversight and in collaboration with patients,
their families, physicians, and the community’’ (Monsen
and de Blok 2013, p. 55).
The goal of Buurtzorg is to care, ‘‘for patients in need of
home, hospice, and dementia care, working with the fam-
ily, primary care providers, and community resources to
help patients maintain their independence in the least
restrictive environment possible’’ (Monsen and de Blok
2013, p. 55; de Blok 2011). To this purpose, Buurtzorg
provides six key services: (1) holistic assessment of the
client’s needs, (2) mapping the client’s networks of pos-
sible informal care, (3) indentifying and coordinating other
formal care providers, (4) care delivery, (5) client support
in his/her social environment, and (6) promotion of self-
care and independence (Royal College of Nursing 2015,
pp. 3–4).
In the ‘old’ functionally concentrated homecare orga-
nizations, including the organization de Blok worked for,
nurses were allocated to units performing one particular
activity for all clients of the organization. Such a func-
tionally concentrated homecare organization consists, for
instance, of four units: a unit ‘intake,’ a unit ‘house
cleaning,’ a unit ‘personal hygiene,’ and a unit ‘personal
health.’ Caregivers in each of these units are potentially
coupled to all the organization’s clients and perform one of
these four activities.
Apart from (possible) planning problems with respect to
the allocation of caregivers to clients and (potentially)
inefficient travel of caregivers between clients, this high
functional concentration has two consequences that hinder
the realization of the ‘teleological,’ ‘social,’ and
‘deliberative’ context required for exercising and devel-
oping moral character.
The first consequence of high functional concentration is
that caregivers are potentially coupled to all clients.
Because of this, each caregiver sees many different clients
and each client sees many different caregivers. Monsen and
de Blok (2013, p. 57) report the case of a client that was
visited by more than 30 different caregivers in one month.
As a result, it becomes hard, if not impossible, for care-
givers and clients to develop meaningful human relations.
Instead of caring for ‘their’ clients; i.e., clients that they
know and are engaged with, caregivers care for clients that
are seen as more or less abstract, exchangeable, ‘objects’
receiving care. And instead of being cared for by ‘their’
caregivers; i.e., caregivers that they know and are engaged
with, clients see caregivers as more or less abstract,
exchangeable, ‘subjects’ providing care.
The second consequence of high functional concentration
in the ‘old’ homecare organizations is that each caregiver
only performs a small part of the total process of providing
homecare, e.g., a caregiver performs only ‘cleaning’ or only
‘washing’ activities. This makes it difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for caregivers to oversee the whole process of providing
care and to become interested in both the effects of and their
contribution to this process. Instead, caregivers concentrate
on their own activity in this whole process, resulting in
fragmented care (Nandram 2015a, p. 19).
Abstract relations between ‘objects’ and ‘subjects’ of
care in contrast to meaningful human relations between
client and caregiver and partial care in contrast to holistic
care seem to be two consequences of functional
differentiation.
In combination, these two consequences considerably
reduce the probability of realizing the ‘teleological,’ ‘so-
cial,’ and ‘deliberative’ context requirements.
The teleological context requires organizational mem-
bers to be in touch with the actual realization of the
organization’s goal; contributing to the quality of life and
autonomy of clients. However, because of functional con-
centration, it is difficult for caregivers to both establish
meaningful relations with individual clients and to see and
assess the effects of their activities in the light of the ‘telos’
of the organization. Instead of providing ‘holistic’ care for
‘their’ clients, caregivers focus on performing their ‘par-
tial’ activity with respect to continuously changing—more
or less anonymous—clients (e.g., cleaning some client’s
house in a particular amount of time). As a result, they will
run the risk of disengaging from the goal of the organiza-
tion as a whole.
Moreover, because high functional concentration stands
in the way of realizing the teleological context
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requirement, it also hinders effective communication about
the organization’s ‘telos’ which is a part of the social
context requirement (requirement 3).
Finally, high functional concentration makes it difficult
to both oversee and be interested in the (possible) moral
consequences of one’s actions. Because each caregiver
directly moves to some next client ‘B’ after, for instance,
washing a client ‘A,’ he or she is not in a position to
experience the medical or house cleaning implications of
the washing activity. Here, functional concentration, makes
it impossible to oversee the moral (and other) conse-
quences of one’s actions. Moreover, because each care-
giver sees many different clients and sees these clients only
from the partial perspective of his or her activity, it also
becomes difficult to become interested in the possible
consequences of these actions. In this way, high functional
concentration also stands in the way of realizing the
deliberative context requirement. Because, both the ulti-
mate goal of one’s activities in a functionally structured
organization remain hidden, it becomes difficult in this
type of organization to choose the right action for the right
reason. Moreover, because it is virtually impossible to
oversee and be interested in the moral implications of one’s
actions, it becomes difficult to reflect on and learn from
these implications in the light of the goal of these actions.
However, both are necessary to exercise and develop work-
related virtues.
Because it is hard to realize the ‘teleological,’ ‘social,’
and ‘deliberative’ context requirement in a functionally
concentrated structure, organizational members working in
such a structure are not helped, but hindered to develop a
work-related virtuous character. More in particular, orga-
nizational members are hindered to:
• keep in touch with and reflect on the goal of the
organization in the light of doing the right thing for the
right reasons (teleological context requirement);
• discuss their actions and reasons for doing them with
relevant other organizational members in the light of
doing the right thing for the right reasons, thereby
establishing an organizational ethos (social context
requirement);
• relate their own actions to the realization of the
organizational goal and reflect on the appropriateness
of these action in the light of doing what is the right
thing, thereby exercising and developing their moral
character (deliberative context requirement).
As such, functional concentration, seems a first step
towards eradicating instead of fostering the exercise and
development of our moral character in organizations.
In contrast, Buurtzorg has been organized to achieve a
low level of functional concentration at the enterprise
level. To this purpose, de Blok formed teams consisting
of up to twelve nurses that perform all nursing activities
for clients in a specific neighborhood (Monsen and de
Blok 2013, p. 56; Nandram 2015a, 66–67). In this way,
units are structured to couple caregivers to only a subset
of the total client population, i.e., to ‘their’ clients in a
particular neighborhood.
Besides advantages related to both the planning of the
allocation of caregivers to clients and traveling time
between clients, this functionally de-concentrated structure
allows caregivers to stay in touch with the organization’s
goal, for caregivers in each team are related to the well-
being and autonomy of ‘their’ more or less fixed set of
clients in ‘their’ neighborhood (teleological context). More
in particular, caregivers are given the opportunity to get to
know their clients and to see the effects of their activities
on both the quality of life and autonomy of these clients
(teleological context). For instance, after changing to
Buurtzorg, the client that saw 30 different caregivers per
month, only sees one of three nurses (from a team of
twelve) who, ‘‘bathes, toilets, and dresses him in addition
to providing medications and preparing simple meals.
Visits (two to three per day) last 30 min to an hour and
demonstrate the bond he’s formed with this nursing team’’
(Monsen and de Blok 2013, p. 57). In this way, nurses get
the opportunity to reflect on the goal of the organization
and its realization in actu from the perspective of doing the
right thing for the right reasons.
In addition, caregivers are given the opportunity to
discuss their activities both in relation to each other and
their client’s well-being, allowing them to fine-tune both
their job-related skills and moral virtues (social context
requirement).
Moreover, because caregivers can oversee and experi-
ence the consequences of their actions, they are enabled to
exercise and develop their moral character. They can
actually see the technical and moral implications of their
actions, reflect on these implications, and in this way,
develop their work-related moral virtues and practical
wisdom.
Finally, low functional concentration at the enterprise
level provides the right conditions for both decentralization
and the design of virtuous jobs at the job level of the
organization.
In general, from a virtue ethical perspective, low func-
tional concentration at the enterprise level seems to be
preferable to high functional concentration. It provides the
required teleological and social context to organizational
members and sets the stage for the design of jobs that
enable organizational members to exercise and develop
their moral character. High functional concentration, on the
other hand, seems to stand in the way of the realization of
the teleological and social context requirement. Moreover,
once functional concentration is ‘high,’ it is virtually
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impossible to ‘reintroduce’ the required teleological and
social context by means of the design of individual jobs.
Enterprise Level: Decentralization
The Parameter Decentralization
The second structural parameter that is relevant at the
enterprise level is the degree of decentralization of decision
authority; also referred to as the degree of participation in
decision making (cf. Pugh et al. 1968; Aiken and Hage
1971; Pierce and Delbecq 1977). De Sitter (1994) defines
decentralization in terms of the degree of separation
between production and control activities.
In the case of ‘low’ decentralization, production and
control activities are separated into different tasks. Deci-
sion authority is taken away from the operational level and
concentrated in a hierarchy of managerial tasks. In case of
‘high’ decentralization, control and production activities
are integrated into tasks. Decision authority is dispersed
among (many) members of the organization—down to the
operational level (cf. Zammuto and O’Connor 1992).
If decentralization is ‘high,’ organizational members can
control their own production activities. Decentralized
structures imply a flat hierarchy. In this paper, the param-
eter ‘decentralization’ is relevant for description and design
purposes at the enterprise level of an organization. The
parameter ‘job specialization’ deals with the allocation of
regulatory (and operational) activities to jobs of individual
members of the organization.
Virtuous Decentralization and Its Application in Practice
Once activities have been grouped into flows (low func-
tional concentration), the level of decentralization directly
affects the realization of the teleological and social context
(requirements 1 and 3) and sets the stage for the deliber-
ative context (requirement 2). It can be argued that high
levels of decentralization in flow-oriented units have a
positive effect on realizing these requirements.
High decentralization in flow-oriented units means that
each unit is authorized to make decisions with respect to its
own input, throughput and output and can participate in
discussions about the strategy of the organization as a
whole. The authority of each unit is governed by Beer’s
principle of freedom and constraint (Beer 1994). This
principle entails that, under the constraint that it does not
harm the viability of the organization as a whole, each unit
has the freedom to make decisions about flow-related goals
(strategic regulation), organizational design (regulation by
design), and operational matters (operational regulation).
By means of high decentralization, each of the units is not
only focused on producing its contribution to society,
governed by the principle of freedom and constraint, it can
also regulate with respect to this contribution. Units can
assume actual responsibility for both their own and the
organization’s contribution to society (teleological and
social requirement).
In the case of Buurtzorg, decentralization is high. At the
unit (i.c. team) level it is realized, roughly along Beer’s
principle of freedom and constraint. To begin with, deci-
sion power is allocated to the teams, making them ‘self-
directed.’ In this way, each team can, ‘‘develop its own
‘personality’ functioning as a unified whole […] The nur-
ses decide together what to do, and each team is recognized
for its collective wisdom and knowledge of what is best for
its patients and community’’ (Monsen and de Blok 2013,
p. 57). ‘Management’ is needed only, ‘‘to keep (1) the
outside world outside, particularly if it’s disturbing the
work of the nurses, and (2) the collective ambition and
organizational principles alive’’ (ibid, p. 57). As a result,
each team becomes responsible for shaping and realizing
Buurtzorg’s ‘telos’ in its own neighborhood (teleological
requirement). Moreover, conditions are created for dis-
cussing this ‘neighborhood’-related ‘telos’ in the team
(social requirement).
Low decentralization in flow oriented units is detri-
mental to the realization of the teleological and social
context requirement. Although units are focused on pro-
ducing their particular contribution to society, they neither
participate in strategic decision making about this contri-
bution nor do they have the authority to decide with respect
to their own input, throughput, and output. In this way,
units get little or no responsibility for the goals they are
supposed to realize or for the means they are supposed to
use to realize these goals.
For a designer who wants to design virtuous structures,
low decentralization in highly functionally concentrated
units is a horrific scenario. Not only are these units pri-
marily focused on their own function and not on the pro-
duction of a particular subset of the organization’s order
types, they also are not involved in strategy formulation
and have little say in the actual design and operational
regulation of the unit. Now, it becomes almost impossible
to be in touch with or involved in discussions about the
organization’s contribution to society (requirements 1 and
3). Actually, high functional concentration in combination
with low decentralization was the case in the ‘old’ home-
care organizations in the Netherlands. In these organiza-
tions, caregivers did not have decision power with respect
to the regulation of their work. Instead, a hierarchy of
managers was needed, sapping away scarce financial
resources, and perhaps more important, the involvement,
creativity, and professional love of the caregivers that did
the actual work. In these organizations, caregivers became
‘morally disengaged’ from the work they were doing or, as
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in the case of de Blok, left the organization they worked
for.
Virtuous Structures at the Job Level
In discussions about the relation between organizational
structures and virtue ethics, the level of individual jobs gets
the most attention (e.g., Weaver 2006; Beadle and Knight
2012). However, focusing on this level in isolation is
dangerous. Without the right structural conditions at the
enterprise level, it is difficult to establish the required
relation between the ‘telos’ of the organization and the jobs
of organizational members. Once high functional concen-
tration and low decentralization at the enterprise level
‘hide’ the ‘telos’ of the organization to workers in the
functionally concentrated units and ‘rob’ them of the
decision power to regulate with respect to the processes
and goals they pursue. It becomes hard, if not impossible,
to ‘reintroduce’ both the ‘telos’ and the decision power at
the level of individual jobs.
Given this proviso, it can be asked how individual job
should be designed in order to enable the realization of the
requirements connected to the development and application
of work-related virtues.
At the job level, the relevant parameters are ‘job special-
ization’ and ‘formalization.’ The values of these parameters
directly affect the possibilities organizational members have
to exercise and develop their moral character in an adequate
social context (requirements 2 and 3). If the right conditions
have been created by means of unit grouping and decentral-
ization at the enterprise level, the exercise of these virtues can
be, as much as possible, related to the societal contribution and
impact of the organization (requirement 1). Below, we first
discuss the parameters job specialization and formalization
(‘‘Parameters at the Job Level: Jobs Specialization and For-
malization’’ section). Then, we argue that low levels of job
specialization and formalization are conducive to realizing the
three context requirements (‘‘Virtuous Structures at the Job
Level’’ section). Finally, we illustrate this using the Buurtzorg
example (‘‘Virtuous Structures at the Job Level: Practical
Example’’ section).
Parameters at the Job Level: Jobs Specialization
and Formalization
As indicated, the parameter ‘job specialization’ refers to
the design of individual jobs. It refers to the degree to
which production or regulatory activities are split up into
sub-tasks (cf. Pugh et al. 1968; Mintzberg 1983; de Sitter
1994; de Sitter and den Hertog 1997; Donaldson 2001).
Organizations may vary on this parameter ranging from
‘high’ to ‘low’ specialization.
In the case of ‘high’ job specialization, the organization
has many short-cycled, specialized operational jobs (high
horizontal specialization) and many specialized regulatory
jobs (vertical specialization). In the case of ‘low’ special-
ization, operational and regulatory activities are integrated
into ‘broad and coherent’ jobs, covering a larger part of the
operational process.
The parameter ‘formalization’ can be defined as the
degree to which jobs must follow specified rules or pro-
cedures (e.g., Donaldson 2001, p. 22). In organizations
with a high degree of formalization ‘‘[…] a codified body
of rules, procedures or behavior descriptions is developed
to handle decision and work processing’’ (Pierce and
Delbecq 1977, p. 31). Moreover, as these authors add, such
organizations see to ‘‘strict enforcement’’ of these rules and
procedures. In organizations with low formalization, this
type of procedural control is less important. Although
formalization is a relevant parameter at both organizational
levels, for our purposes in this paper, it is particularly
important at the job level.
In organization design literature, high specialization is
often accompanied by high formalization (as in bureau-
cracies) and low specialization is often treated along with
low formalization (as in organic structures)—cf. Burns
and Stalker 1961; Donaldson 2001. However, it should be
stressed that they are separate parameters. It is possible to
have a highly specialized job with low formalization—a
small specific job with few rules or procedures governing
it (e.g., your job is to put on safety stockings as part of
elderly home care but you can do it as you see fit).
Similarly, it is possible to have a broad job (in terms of
covering a large part of the primary process) which is
tightly governed by rules and procedures.
Virtuous Structures at the Job Level
Virtuous Job Specialization
Virtuous structures at the enterprise level are the point of
departure for the design of virtuous jobs. This means that
organizational members work in flows that allow them to
be in touch with the organization’s contribution to society.
To these members, the units they work in appear as
‘teams.’ As a result of decentralization, these teams are
semi-autonomous units (Thompson 1967; de Sitter 1993;
Galbraith 1977; Anand and Daft 2007).
In order to enable team members to exercise and
develop their moral character, jobs should be designed to:
(1) allow them to see the consequences of their actions and
(2) provide them with the operational variety and regula-
tory capacity needed to devise, choose and implement
morally appropriate actions (i.e., requirement 2 should be
met).
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To create a deliberative context, it seems advisable to
keep the value of the parameter job specialization low. This
means that team members have relatively long cycled,
broad and logically cohesive operational tasks. These tasks
should comprise activities that, as much as possible, reflect
the organization’s contribution to society. Moreover,
operational tasks should be designed to (partially) overlap.
This allows team members to help each other. Finally, team
members should have the authority to regulate with respect
to both their own and the team’s effort. More in particular,
they should be allowed to cope with work-related problems
(operational regulation), to contribute to design issues (e.g.,
the design of working methods; design regulation), and to
the team’s strategy formulation (strategic regulation).
Because of the design of their jobs, team members
remain, as much as is possible, in touch with the organi-
zation’s contribution to society and can see the impact of
their activities on the organization’s end products or cli-
ents. Broad and partially overlapping tasks allow organi-
zational members to actually make a difference to the work
of others and both see and discuss what this difference is.
This effect is amplified by introducing regulatory activities
into the tasks of team members. Team members are
induced to feel responsible for and discuss regulatory
decisions, can experience the effects of these decisions on
their own and the team’s functioning, and can see what
these decisions mean for their clients. In this way, both the
team and the individual job become a ‘locus’ for the
exercise and development of work-related skills, moral
virtues and practical wisdom.
These, from a virtue ethical perspective, beneficial
effects, are hard to realize in the worst case situation of
high job specialization in a highly functionally concen-
trated enterprise level structure. Such a design systemati-
cally severs the connection between organizational
members and their organization’s contribution to society.
Moreover, because jobs are devoid of operational and
regulatory variety, they reduce opportunities organizational
members have to feel involved with and responsible for
their actions.
Virtuous Formalization
It is easy to see that high formalization would ‘undo’ the
benefits of the operational and regulatory variety of virtu-
ous jobs. The operational variety that is given to team
members is taken away by a codified body of rules, pro-
cedures, or behavior descriptions developed to handle
decision and work processing. Moreover, regulatory vari-
ety is reduced by ‘regulators’ enforcing these rules and
procedures. For this reason, in virtuous structures, low jobs
specialization should be accompanied by low formaliza-
tion. Given the principle of freedom and constraint, low
formalization allows organizational members to discuss
and develop job-related values, norms, and standards based
on their work experiences (see also Schwartz and Sharpe
2010 for the influence of formalization). Formalization,
then, disables a deliberative context.
Virtuous Structures at the Job Level: Practical
Example
In the example of Buurtzorg, individual jobs are
designed to keep both job specialization and formaliza-
tion low. In the team, each caregiver performs the six
activities that constitute Buurtzorg’s core activities
mentioned above. In contrast to the short cycle times in
the case of high job specialization (e.g., quickly washing
a client to move on to the next one), caregivers are
allowed relatively long cycle times to perform the
activities they consider necessary (even up to an hour as
Monsen and de Blok (2013, p. 57) report). This allows
caregivers to see, assess and improve the impact and
meaning of their work. Moreover, caregivers, as a part of
their job, coordinate and regulate with respect to the
team’s effort. This not only reduces coordination costs, it
also allows caregivers to help each other if this is nee-
ded. Low specialization combined with low formaliza-
tion, provides caregivers with the freedom to assess, on a
day to day basis, their clients well-being and to act on
this assessment. In this way, they can develop their
‘ethos’ with respect to both their work and their orga-
nization’s contribution to society.
In the worst case example of high job specialization and
high formalization in a functionally concentrated and
centralized home care organization, caregivers are sub-
jected to a regime of small and short-cycled tasks governed
by highly specified standards. For instance, a ‘house-
cleaner’ should perform a prescribed set of activities in a
particular amount of time and then move on to a next client
according to a schedule produced by the planning depart-
ment. Moreover, because of vertical specialization, care-
givers have no say in what the activities, the standards, or
the schedule should be. Not only does this type of orga-
nization prohibit the realization of the teleological context
criterion (who is still interested in the well-being and
autonomy of one of many clients?), it also hinders care-
givers: to see the impact of their actions and enjoy the
operational and regulatory variety needed to exercise their
moral character, and to communicate about both their own
work and the organization’s contribution to society. In fact,
the detrimental ‘moral’ effects of high job specialization
and high formalization echo the moral problems of
bureaucracies raised by others (e.g., Merton 1957;
MacIntyre 1985; Jos 1988; Luban et al. 1992).
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Virtuous Structures and Networks
Although the topic of this paper is virtuous structures in
organizations, some attention should be paid to inter-or-
ganizational networks taken as ‘‘a variety of forms of
cooperation, including joint ventures, strategic alliances,
collaborations, and consortia’’ (Provan et al. 2007, p. 481).
The reason for this is that, for instance, an organization
may be structured to comply with the three requirements
defined above. But what if this organization has concen-
trated on designing clothes and sources the finished product
from sweatshops in a country far away (cf. Anand and Daft
2007 on ‘hollow organizations’)? Or, an organization may
participate in a network of organizations that provides a
particular product or service (cf. Anand and Daft 2007 on
‘modular organizations’). But, what if this network is
structured in a way that does not provide conditions for the
development and application of work-related virtues?
To start discussing this difficult topic, it is useful to
distinguish between at least two questions. The first ques-
tion pertains to the selection of network partners, the sec-
ond to the structural design of the network.
With regard to the first question (selection), it can be
argued that all organizations need to deal with this ques-
tion. The reason for this is that all organizations in some
way depend on other organizations, e.g., for (raw) mate-
rials, equipment, capital, or services. These inter-organi-
zational dependency relations also imply that some
organizations source other organizations with products or
services. In this way, a complex and dynamic matrix of
sourcing relations is established. Given its primary activi-
ties each organization in this matrix has its own network of
in- and/or output dependency relations with other organi-
zations (cf. Thompson 1967 on domains of organized
action and task environments; see also Borgatti and Foster
2003).
Contingent on market characteristics, organizations are
more or less free to select the organizations they engage
with or to define the terms of this engagement. For
instance, an organization requiring a particular input that is
offered by many organizations and demanded by many
(other) organizations, enjoys more degrees of freedom than
an organization requiring input that is offered by only a few
and demanded by many organizations (Thompson 1967;
Scott 2003).
However, in spite of these differing degrees of freedom,
it is, perhaps, still possible to suggest a principle of ‘‘vir-
tuous’’ selection (for a discussion of similar principles
related to labor conditions and social issues in supply
chains, see Ciliberti et al. 2009). For in- and output pur-
poses, an organization in focus that wants to enable the
application and development of work-related virtues,
should:
1. as much as is possible, engage with organizations that
also have this goal and the accompanying virtuous
structures and in- and/or output relations to show for it;
2. as much as is needed, encourage organizations it
engages with to pursue this goal and to implement the
accompanying virtuous structures and in- and output
relations;
3. abstain from engaging with organizations that contin-
uously, explicitly, and deliberately violate the realiza-
tion of this goal, for instance, by means of the products
or services they deliver, the design of their structure, or
their in- and output relations with other organizations.
If this principle is applied, the organization in focus
preferably engages with organizations that, in turn,
preferably engage with organizations that want to enable
the application and development of work-related virtues. In
this way, this organization, ideally, becomes part of a
network of organizations, that apply this principle: a vir-
tuous network of inter-organizational in- and output
relations.
The second question pertains to the structural design of
networks: how should a network’s structure be designed to
enable the development and application of work-related
virtues? This question is particularly relevant for organi-
zations that engage in a more or less durable cooperation
with other organizations to produce products or services for
particular groups of clients, each of the participating
organizations, in isolation, could not have produced (cf.
Anand and Daft 2007 on modular organizations). In such
cases, not only selection is an issue, but also the network’s
structural design.
An example might be a network designed to provide
integrated care for problematic youngsters in a city. In the
Netherlands, such networks were established under the
name of the ‘Veiligheidshuis’ (literally, the ‘Safety
House’). In a Veiligheidshuis, local schools, the police
force, the public prosecutor, clinics for psychiatric and
addiction care, institutions supporting community work,
and local employers work together to improve the well
being and societal prospects of these youngsters. Each of
the organizations participating in this network has its own
goals and primary activities, its own organizational struc-
ture, and is involved in its own network of in- and/or output
relations. Moreover, each of these organizations, in isola-
tion, can provide a thread of the safety needed by the tar-
geted youngsters in that city. However, in isolation, the
primary activities of the participating organizations do not
provide the actual integration of these threads into an
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effective safety net. To actually weave this net, (1) the
network’s goal should be formulated, e.g., ‘providing
integrated care for problematic youngsters,’ (2) organiza-
tions participating in the network should be selected (using
the selection principle specified above), and (3) the net-
work should be structured to enable not only the realization
of the formulated goal, but also the requirements for the
exercise and development of work-related virtues.
Just as in the case of the macro-level of organizations,
the structural parameters ‘unit grouping’ and ‘decentral-
ization’ seem to be the most important parameters at the
level of the network (Provan et al. 2007, p. 485 deal with
decentralization in terms of ‘governance’). By means of the
values of these parameters, the network should be struc-
tured to provide the required teleological and a social
context and set the stage for individual jobs that allow
organizational members to exercise their moral character.
An extreme case of functionally concentration and
centralization, may serve as our point of departure. In this
case, each of the participating organizations, by means of
its own primary activities, personnel, and equipment, pro-
vides its own contribution to the network’s output. Like the
‘sawing,’ ‘sanding,’ ‘assembly’ and ‘finishing’ depart-
ments in a functionally concentrated organization, each of
the organizations participating in the network focuses on its
own functional contribution with respect to all order types.
In order to realize the network’s goal (e.g., the integrated
care for youngsters), the participating organizations need to
coordinate the integration of their contributions. This
integration can be achieved by means of ‘standardization’
in the case of pooled dependency relations between the
contributions of the participating organizations and the
network’s final output, ‘planning’ in the case of sequential
dependency relations, and ‘mutual adjustment’ in the case
of reciprocal dependency relations (cf. Thompson 1967 or
Mintzberg 1983). In the example of the Veiligheidshuis,
coordination was achieved by a team consisting of repre-
sentatives of the participating organizations, discussing
youngsters on a case by case basis (mutual adjustment).
Based on these discussions, the required effort of each of
the participating organizations was determined and fed
back to these organizations. High centralization in this case
means that the participating organizations have little say in
both the network’s strategy and design.
From the perspective of virtue ethics, such a function-
ally concentrated network seems suboptimal. Workers in
each of the participating organization primarily focus on
the ‘telos’ of their own organization. The only way to stay
in touch with the network’s goal is by means of the coor-
dination mechanism, in the case of the Veiligheidshuis, the
team discussing the youngsters case by case. Low decen-
tralization, further reduces chances to feel involved with or
communicate about the network’s goal. In the case of the
Veiligheidshuis, regulation with respect to goals—i.e.,
balancing between the network’s goal and the goals of the
participating organizations—proved to be quite
cumbersome.
At the other extreme, a design supporting flow produc-
tion and decentralization may be implemented. To this
purpose, the participating organizations establish a new
unit (e.g., a joint venture) in which the operational activi-
ties needed to realize the network’s goal are grouped. This
unit has its ‘own’ goal (e.g., improving the well-being and
societal prospects of difficult youngsters), activities, per-
sonnel (that may be seconded by the participating organi-
zations), and equipment. This unit may, then, be
subdivided into further flows. Moreover, the unit performs
its own regulatory activities. Given the principle of free-
dom and constraint, it can decide with regard to its own
strategy, design, and operational regulation. In this way,
conditions are created for workers in the new unit to keep
in touch with the network’s goal and to discuss the unit’s
contribution to and impact on society (teleological and
social requirement). Just as in the case of the enterprise
level of individual organizations, the realization of the
teleological and social context requirement at the level of
inter-organizational networks seem to be related to flow
production and high decentralization.
In sum, although it is impossible here to exhaustively
discuss the topic of ‘responsible networks,’ it can still be
argued that the effects of intra-organizational structures
enabling organizational members to exercise their moral
character are not necessarily ‘undone’ at the network level.
Careful selection of network partners and prudent design of
network structures, in principle, can help organizational
members to live a fulfilled life in the organizations and
networks they work for.
Conclusion
In this paper, we discussed organizational structures
enhancing the exercise and development of moral charac-
ter—‘virtuous’ structures. To discuss them, we considered
what it means to ‘exercise and develop one’s moral char-
acter’ in the context of doing one’s job (i.e., it entails
genuinely desiring that the organizational output con-
tributes to the well-being of organizational and societal
members, and deliberating, choosing and implementing
job-related actions realizing this desire). Moreover, we
argued that in order for organizational members to exercise
and develop their moral character, three requirements (a
‘‘teleological,’’ ‘‘deliberative’’ and ‘‘social’’ context)
should be realized. Next, referring to four structural
parameters and two organizational levels, we described the
type of structures that can help realize these requirements.
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These structures, ideally, consist of ‘rich’ jobs within semi-
autonomous teams within larger semi-autonomous flows
(in the case of Buurtzorg, the teams even equaled the
flows). Low functional concentration, resulting in flow
production and semi-autonomous teams at the enterprise
level are needed to allow organizational members to stay in
touch with and communicate about the ‘telos’ of the
organization (teleological and social context condition) and
enable the design of rich jobs at the micro-level. Rich jobs,
i.e., low levels of specialization, separation and formal-
ization at the job level, are needed to allow organizational
members to see the consequences of their activities, to give
them the operational and regulatory variety needed to
exercise and develop their moral character, and to discuss
their activities with each other (deliberative and social
context requirement).
In addition, we explored the type of structures of orga-
nizational networks conducive to virtuous behavior. Here,
we described criteria for the selection of virtuous network
partners and discussed that if networks of organizations are
functionally concentrated and centralized, they risk the
chance of disabling the exercise and development of moral
character. Creating partnerships of teams of network-part-
ners who jointly work on complete processes and are
jointly responsible for realizing some output seems to be
more desirable.
In our paper, we indicated that several authors have
already discussed the enhancing role of structures for
exercising and developing moral character. With this
paper, we contributed to this discussion in the following
ways. First, our framework contains more structural
parameters than appear in the extant literature. In particu-
lar, as we have argued, ‘‘unit grouping’’ is an important but
neglected parameter. Second, we extend the extant litera-
ture by providing a more detailed framework for under-
standing and designing the required structures for
virtuousness. We hope that our analysis makes more
explicit that and how structural parameters are involved in
designing tasks in which one can be in touch with goals and
output and in which one has the operational and regulatory
variety needed for exercising and developing virtues. This
framework thus enables us to appreciate the complex of
parameters involved in suggestions for structural
improvements made in prior literature. Third, we extend
current thinking about structures for exercising virtues by
discussing the interrelations between and the joint effect of
structural parameters on virtuous behavior. We discussed,
for instance, that structures at the macro-level condition the
design of individual jobs in which virtues can be exercised
and developed. We also discussed that the positive effect of
one parameter on virtuousness can be enhanced or frus-
trated by the effect of another parameter (e.g., that high
formalization may undo the positive effect of low job-
specialization). Fourth, the framework adds to our under-
standing of supportive structures by including three dif-
ferent levels: the macro-level of the organization, the
micro-level of individual work, and the level of networks
of organizations. In the extant literature, the network level
is hardly touched upon.
In closing this paper, we would like to remark that
delineating ‘‘virtuous structures’’ is only a part of the
bigger project of delineating ‘‘virtuous organizations.’’
Structures are not the only supportive organizational ele-
ments. Besides the presence of virtuous structures, other
organizational factors may still influence the behavior of
organizational members. For instance, appraisal and
reward systems (cf. Schwartz and Sharpe 2010; Schwartz
2011), culture (e.g., the work on ‘‘ethical climates’’ starting
with Victor and Cullen 1988); or particular styles of
leadership (e.g., Trevin˜o et al. 2000) may either undo or
help realize the opportunities created by virtuous struc-
tures. The same holds for technologies supporting organi-
zational processes. For instance, technologies increasing or
the physical and emotional distance between organizational
members and clients may harm virtuous behavior (cf. Jones
1991, on the relation between ‘distance’ and virtuous
behavior). An important line of research, then, might be to
align this knowledge and to arrive at supportive infras-
tructures (comprising for instance supportive structures,
culture, leadership, technology, or incentive-systems) so as
to understand how organizations may foster exercising and
developing moral character of its members.
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